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ELIMINATE THE GRAND JURY
XVILIA.AM J. CAMPRELL*
INTRODUCTfON

Following almost two hundred years of continuous and unwavering support of the institution
we know as the grand jury, the Supreme Court
recently announced an opinion which seems to
suggest the first "leak in the dike" of its regard
for that once exalted institution. Speaking for the
six-member majority in United States v. Dionisio,'

Justice Stewart acknowledged that "the Grand
Jury may not always serve its historic role as a
protective bulwark standing solidly between the
ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor. .. . " Even stronger expressions of concern
over the continuing viability of the grand jury are
found in the dissenting opinions filed there by
Justices Douglas and Marshall. Justice Douglas, in
graciously referring to my report to the Conference
of Metropolitan Chief District Judges of the
Federal Judicial Center,3 observed that, "It is
indeed common knowledge that the Grand Jury,
having been conceived as a bulwark between the
citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the
Executive."' 4 Justice Marshall emphasized the
dangers facing grand jury independence as compounded by the Dionisio decision itself.'
These comments are significant not only because of their source but also because they were
not germane to the resolution of the problem before the Court. The volunteered concern of the
highest judicial officers of our land over the method
* J.D., L.L.M., D.C.L., Litt.D., L.L.D.; Senior
Judge, United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. Judge Campbell is presently sitting
regularly with the Court of Appeals of the Seventh
Circuit while also serving nationwide as Chairman of
Seminars for education and training with the Federal
Judicial Center.
193 S.Ct. 764 (1973). See also United States v. Mara,
93 S.Ct. 774 (1973). In both Dionisio and Mara the majority of the Court acknowledged the grand jury's
right to subpoena witnesses and also to require them
to produce nontestimonial evidence where the physical
characteristics sought to be produced are "constantly
exposed to the public."
293 S.Ct. 764, 773 (1973).
'See Campbell, Delay in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D.
229, 253 (1972). See also Campbell, Proposalsfor finprovements in the Administration of CriminalJustice, 54
Ca. BAR Rze. 75 (1972).
493 S.Ct. 777 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

'93 S.Ct. 781 (1973) (Marshall, J.dissenting).

by which criminal prosecutions are initiated
merits the careful reflection of all Americans,
especially those involved with the administration
of justice in this country.
My thesis is simple, although I hope not simplistic. The grand jury should be abolished; prosecution should be commenced upon an information
filed by the prosecuting offilcial and followed by a
probable cause hearing before a judicial officer,
such as a magistrate, who would determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to permit the prosecution to continue.
Abolition of the grand jury is not a revolutionary idea. In England, from whom we borrowed
this noble institution of the past, the grand jury
was abolished except in rare cases by the Administration of Justice Act of 1933.6 Many of our own
states have to a greater or lesser degree followed
suit. According to a survey compiled in 1964, only
five states require prosecution of all crimes by indictment; 22 states demand that only serious
offenses be initiated by indictment, and 23 states
permit prosecution of substantially all crimes by
either information or indictment.
In my view, the movement away from the grand
jury process was and is prompted by the realization that the historical assumption concerning its
neutrality is no longer true. Today, the grand jury
is the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he is
candid, will concede that he can indict anybody,
at any time, for almost anything, before any grand
jury. I intend no criticism of prosecuting officials
by this observation. I am a former prosecutor. I
know that the talented and dedicated men and
women of our prosecuting offices perform a necessary and laudable public function. I merely wish
here to call attention to the present states of affairs.
My objective is to analyze the operations of the
grand jury in the context of its stated purpose and
function, and to suggest, within the same framework, an alternative method of initiating prosecutions which in my judgment will ultimately im-

I See T. PLUcKNITT, A CoNcisx HiSTORY OF THE
COMON LAW 112 n. 1 (5th ed. 1956).
7 See Spain, The Grand Jury Past and Present: A
Survey, Air. Car L.Q. 119, 126-42 (1964).
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prove the status and the performance of the prosecutor, as well as restore the original purpose of the
grand jury-protecting the citizen. This approach
differs substantially from that of many others who
have considered the subject matter.8 The comments and conclusions made herein represent in
large measure the product of over thirty-five
years parsonal involvement in the administration
of criminal justice, both as prosecutor and judge.
It is from this perspective that the analysis is
made.'
EvoLUmIoN OF THE GRA N JURY

Although the early history of the grand jury is
clouded, the ancestor of our present-day inquest
made its first appearance in England during the
reign of King Henry II. Laymen were summoned
by the King to what was called the Assize of
Clarendon. They were responsible for ferreting
out crimes in their locale and informing the Crown.
8See, e.g., NATIONAL ComIssION ON LAW OBSERVAvCE AND EiocEmENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION

NUMBER 4 (1931) (known as WIc:ERSHrA

ComMIs-

SION REPORT); R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLES' PANEL;
THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941

(1963); Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted
Super Government, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965) (hereinafter
cited as Antell); Coates, Grand Jury: The Prosecutor's
Puppet. Wasteful Nonsense of Criminal Jurisprudence,
33 PENN. B.A.Q. 311 (1962); Foster, Grand Jury Praclice in the 1970's, 32 Omo ST;L.J. 701 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Foster); Lumbard, The Criminal Justice
Revolution and the Grand Jury, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 397
(1967) (hereinafter cited as Lumbard); Mar, The California Grand Jury System: A Vestige of Aristocracy, 1
PAC. L.J 36 (1970); Moley, The Initiation of Criminal
Prosecutions by Indictment or Information, 29 MIcEr.
L. REV. 403 (1931); Morse, A Suney of the Grand Jury
System, 10 ORE. L. Rzv. 101 (1931) (hereinafter cited
as Morse); Shannon, The GrandJury: True Tribunal of
the People or Administrative Agency of the Prosecutor?,
2 N. MEx. L. REv. 141 (1972) (hereinafter cited as
Shannon); Watts, Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or
Expensive Antique', 37 N.C.L. REv. 290 (1959);
Wickersham, The Grand Jury: Weapon Against Crime
and Corruption, 51 A.B.A.J. 1157 (1965) (hereinafter
cited as Wickersham); Younger, The Grand Jury Under
Attack, 104 PA. L. REv. 429 (1955); -Note,An Examina-

lion of the Grand Jury in New York, 2 CoLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 88 (1966); Note, Evaluatingthe Grand Jury's
Role in a Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa Case
Study, 57 IA. L. REv. 1354 (1972); Note, Should the
Grand Jury System be Abolished?, 45 Ky. L.J. 151
(1967); Note, Grand Jury: Bulwark of Prosecutorial
Immunity?, 3 LOYOLA (CHICAGO) L.J. 305 (1972);
Note, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, The
Trial Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. CHI. L. REv.
761 (1972).
9 Over the years I have maintained in many bound
volumes long-hand notes of my impressions during each
trial. In order to challenge the validity of my own convictions, I have attempted to remain current with the
vast literature in the field. However, my remarks here
are my own.

The investigations were conducted largely by the
"grand jurors" themselves, and charges were
lodged not simply upon evidence but upon the
prevailing belief within the community concerning
a suspect's guilt. No one viewed these bodies as
bold guardians of individual rights. They were conceived as a device for enlarging and centralizing
the authority of the King and providing his rule
with the benefits derived from community accusation of crime. Upon return of a charge, a
presumption of guilt arose and the task of demonstrating innocence fell to the accused. Having no
independence from the Crown, these early inquests
became potent weapons for enforcing the royal
authority.1 0
Although it did not specifically refer to any
grand inquest, the famed Magna Carta wrested
from King John at Runnymede by his barons on
June 15, 1215, is, in its broad amplification of the
legal procedural improvements originally granted
by the Charter of Henry I in 1100, frequently
credited with having started the process which we
know as the grand jury. The procedure, however,
even as slightly enlarged in 1216 and 1217 by
Henry III and again in 1297 by Edward I remained
completely within the absolute control of the
Crown and generally public in the nature of its
hearings.
The concept of the grand jury as a body free
from royal influence did not appear until 1681
during the famed Earl of Shaftesbury's case."
The Crown had charged the Earl with treason and
had demanded that the grand jury hear the evidence in open court. The jury insisted on secrecy,
however, and later refused to indict despite extreme pressure from the Attorney General. With
the advent of secrecy in its proceedings, this
council of laymen thereafter developed into the
guardian of individual rights, standing between
the prosecutor and the accused and protecting the
citizen from unfounded accusation of crime.
With these historical underpinnings, the grand
jury was transported to this country by the early
colonists and its was preserved, after independence,
10For more detailed history, see generally I. W.
HoLDswORTH, A HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW (1922);
Antell, supra note 8, at 155; Morse, supra note 8, at
106-18; Note, Evaluating the Grand Jury's Role in a
Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa Case Study, 57
IA. L. REv. 1354, 1357-60 (1972); Note, Should the
Grand Jury System be Abolished?, 45 Ky. L.J. 151
(1967); Note, Grand Jury: Bulwark of Prosecutorial
Immunity?, 3 LOYOLA (CHICAGo) L.J. 305, 307 (1972).
1Proceedings Against the Earl of Shaftesbury, 8
State T. 759 (1968).
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through the fifth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. 2 It thus became entrenched
in our judicial heritage despite many early criticisms that it was not necessary to protect individuals from governmental oppression in a
country with a representative form of government.13 Although England and many of our own
States have long since abandoned the grand jury
as the exclusive means of initiating criminal
prosecutions, the Supreme Court, for obvious constitutional reasons, has consistently resisted any
efforts to limit the broad powers of this body in
the federal field. Thus, until Dionisio the devotion
of our highest judicial tribunal to the grand jury
system was unrelenting, and is pointedly illustrated in Ex Parte Bain,1 with a quotation from
an actual grand jury charge as follows:
The institution of the Grand Jury,

...isof

very

For a
ancient origin in the history of England ....
long period its powers were not clearly defined...
it was at first a body which not only accused, but
which also tried public offenders. However this
may have been its origin, it was at the time of the
settlement of this country an informing and accusing tribunal only, without whose previous action no
person charged with a felony could, except in certain special cases, be put upon his trial. And in the
struggles which at times arose in England between
the powers of the King and the rights of the subjects, it often stood as a barrier against persecution in his name; until, at length, it came to be regarded as an institution by which the subject was
rendered secure against oppression from unfounded
prosecutions of the Crown. In this country, from
the popular character of our institutions, there has
seldom been any contest between the government
and the citizen which required the existence of the
Grand Jury as a protection against oppressive action of the government. Yet the institution was
adopted in this country, and is continued from
considerations similar to those which gave to it its
"U.S. CONST. amend. V:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
"3See R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLES' PANEL: THE
GRAND

JURY IN

THE UNITED

138-54 (1963).
14 121 U.S. 1, 11 (1887).

STATES,

1634-1941, at
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chief value in England, and is designed as a means,
not only of bringing to trial persons accused of
public offenses upon just grounds, but also as a
means of protecting the citizen against unfounded
accusation, whether it comes from government or
be prompted by partisan passion or private enmity.
As to the expansive powers of this body, the
Supreme Court has observed that "lilt is a grand
inquest, a body with powers of investigation and
inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to
be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or
forecasts of the probable result of the investigation,
or by doubts whether any particular individual will
be found properly subject to an accusation of
crime." 1 This early adulation of the high Court
for the grand jury process was reaffirmed in later
decisions. Thus, we see it described as standing
between the prosecutor and the accused, preventing charges based upon intimidating power,
malice of personal ill will;" we find it championed
as the embodiment of a constitutional guarantee
that presupposes an investigative body acting
independently of either prosecutor or judge;17 and
we observe it characterized as recently as 1972 as
"l[an important instrument of effective law enforcement." 18
However the Court chose to view it, early in this
century a growing body of critics of this institution
began to surface. 19 Scholars, prosectuors, judges
and students of the law began questioning whether
the historical underpinnings of the grand jury were
"1Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
16Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded
as a primary security to the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it
serves the invaluable function in our society of
standing between the accuser and the accused,
whether the latter be an individual, minority
group, or other, to determine whether a charge is
founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill
will.
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
17The very purpose of the requirement that a man
be indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeopardy
to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting
attorney or judge.
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960).
"8Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972).
1"See, e.g., Atkinson, The Useless Grand Jury, 15
LAW NOTES 109 (1911); Bronaugh, Shall the Grand
Jury Be Abolished, 25 LAW NOTES 187 (1922); Thompson, Shall the Grand Jury in Ordinary Criminal Cases
Be Dispensed with in Minnesota, 6 MiNN. L. REv. 615
(1922); Note, The Proposed Abolition of Grand Juries,
58 SoL. J. 199 (1914); Note, Shold the Grand Jury
System Be Abolished, 15 YALE L.J. 178 (1906); Note, 17
LAW NoTms 218 (1914).
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still viable in a pluralistic, urban society. Doubts
concerning the independence of the institution and
its status as the great protector were frequently
expressed. The ancient body and its offspring, the
criminal indictment, disappeared in England and
experienced reduced service in many of our own
states.20 Against this massive groundswell of
opinion, one wonders why the Supreme Court
persisted for so long in its unquestioned acceptance
of this body. Whatever the reason, the first inkling
of official skepticism from the Court emerged in
Dionisio. Since the Court has acknowledged that
the Constitutional guarantee presupposes an independent investigative body, it seems appropriate
to examine the present-day validity of that supposition.
THE GRA-D JuRY-ITs FUNCTIONS
AND OPERATIONS

particular skill or training for the different and
highly important responsibilities they are to assume.
Once assembled, the jurors are usually treated
to a rather lofty explanation of the enormity and
significance of their task by the presiding judge of
the particular jurisdiction. The formality of apprising them concerning their powers and obligations having been disposed of, the jurors are then
dispatched to commence their duties.
It is at this juncture that the prosecuting official
makes his first appearance. Although technically
subject to the direction of the grand jury, in
practice the prosecutor actually conducts the
proceedings2
The prosecutor selects which
witnesses the grand jury will subpoena, what evidence it will hear, which documents it will examine,
and which suspected criminal violations it will
consider. It is the prosecutor who will explain and
construe the myriad of laws that the grand jury is
charged to enforce. Moreover, this representative
of the executive branch of the government will also
instruct the jury as to the quantum of proof necessary to justify an indictment.
The impact of the prosecutor's position in this
scheme of things cannot be overestimated. Its
pervasiveness is high-lighted by the simple fact
the grand jury proceedings are non-adversarial in
nature. There is no requirement that both sides be
heard. Witnesses appearing before a grand jury
are not entitled to the presence of counsel.2
Questions propounded a witness are not subject
to the ordinary rules of evidence. 26 The scope of
the grand jury's inquiry, although unlimited in
theory, is subject to the skillful control and direction of the prosecutor. So also is its result
limited by its inability, at least in the federal system, to return an indictment without the prosecutor's written approval.u
Because of the way in which modern society has
developed, grand jurors are no longer summoned
24
FED. R. CIMx. P. 6 (d) authorizes the presence of

The grand jury in a traditional sense has quite
properly been considered an arm of the court. Its
responsibilities are essentially threefold: (1) the
investigation of crimes or "public offenses" committed within the boundaries of its jurisdction;
(2) the identification of persons suspected of having
committed the offenses, and the related determination of whether there is probable cause to
charge a person with an offense; and (3) the publication of its findings to the court by way of an
indictment, presentment, or report.
In most jurisdictions, including the federal system, grand jurors are selected on a random basis
usually from voting lists.21 Some states, notably
California, still follow the old practice of permitting the judges themselves to select the grand
jurors" Whatever the method of selection, the
qualifications for service are quite minimal. Customary legal qualifications include only a minimum
age, mental and physical competency and residence
in the jurisdiction for a certain period of time.n
Although this is satisfactory-even desirable for
petit jurors who function within an adversary system under the constant guidance of an impartial prosecutors in the grand jury room during its sessions,
when the jury is deliberating or voting. Compare
judge-it provides grand jurors who possess no except
Antell, supra note 8, at 155, wherein the author states
2
0The Constitution does not require the states to that in New York the deliberative sessions are attended
prosecutor.
initiate all serious prosecutions by grand jury indict- by2 5the
See, e.g., Antell, supra note 8; Foster, supra note
meat. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
8; United States v. CoraUo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir.),
2
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1861 d seq. (1970); ILL. !Ev.
cerl. denied 396 U.S. 958 (1969). Cf. FEDu. R. Cmn.
STAT. ch. 78, § 9 d seq. (1972); N.Y. JUDIcrARY LAW P. 6 (d); United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 (6th
88 594, 684 (McKinney 1968).
Cir.
26 1968).
22See, e.g., CAr.. PENAL CODE § 903.4 (WEsT 1970).
1See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359
mSee, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch 78, § 2 (1972); FLA.
(1956).
2
STAT. ANN. §§ 40.01, 905.01 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT.
7FED. R. Cam. P. 7(c); Cox v. United States, 342
§ 494.010 (1973).
F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
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to bear witness from their own knowledge or from
knowledge gained through their own community
experiences, as was the case at the time the grand
jury was first established. In our vast, urban
society jurors have no intimate knowledge of the
goings-on within the community. They must
depend, therefore, upon the facts and knowledge
brought before them from extrinsic sources. They
have no investigative skills or resources of their
own and thus the task of gathering facts must be
performed for them by the professional investigative agencies at their disposal-law enforcement
agencies.
Against this framework, the findings of Wayne
Morse's monumental survey of grand jury operations in twenty-one states came as no surprise to
experienced observers of this institution.H The
then Professor (later Senator) Morse, discovered
that of the thousands of cases presented to the
grand juries sitting in those states, less than 5%
of the investigations had been initiated by the
jurors themselves.
In my thirty-five years of judicial experience,
which includes twelve years as Chief Judge in the
Northern District of Illinois and a term as United
States Attorney for the same district, there has
not been a single criminal investigation begun by
a grand jury.
The survey conducted by Professor Morse also
uncovered the fact that in those cases where the
grand jury refused to indict, the prosecutor concurred in that decision 95% of the time.w This
finding also comports with my own observations.
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for a prosecutor
confronted with pressures from the news media to
shift the burden for declining prosecution to the
grand jury. In this way he avoids any personal
accountability for the ultimate decision. The
indictment system thus can provide a prosecutor
with a convenient scapegoat for his actions.
In support of the independence of the grand
jury, it is suggested by some that this body of
laymen enjoys certain powers which counterbalance the potential for prosecutorial influence.3
It is pointed out that grand jurors may extend or
broaden investigations,31 may call and question
Morse, supra note 8.
at 151.
-1 See, e.g., Brown, Ten Reasons Why the Grand Jury
in New York Should be Retained and Strengthened, 22
THE REcoRD 471 (1967); Lumbard, supra note 8;
Wickersham, supra note 8.
31See, e.g., United States v. Kysar, 459 F.2d 422
(10th Cir. 1972); In re Dymo Industries, Inc., 300 F.
Supp. 532 (D.C. Cal. 1969).
2a

21Id.
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witnesses themselves, 2 may direct the production
of documentary evidence,n and may seek legal
advice from the court itself. Too, in most jurisdictions the prosecutor may not volunteer unrequested comment upon the sufficiency of the
evidence and may not be present in the jury room
during actual deliberations.3 The forceful exercise
of its powers could well operate to insure and
maintain the independence of the grand jury.
In my experience, however, these powers are
rarely, if ever, invoked by the jurors. Investigations
of any consequence are always preceded by careful
study and evaluation by the prosecutor's office.
Witnesses are interviewed, documents are sorted
and examined, and the evidence as a whole is
prudently analyzed. The twenty-three laymen who
make up the grand jury possess neither the skills
nor the training for this sophisticated task. Only
after such detailed preparation by law enforcement
officials is the case presented to the grand jury.
The prohibition against volunteered prosecutorial
comment is usually rendered nugatory by the
inevitable jurors' request for the prosecutor's
advice on the sufficiency of the very evidence he
prepared and presented to them. Rarely is any
transcript taken or written on this advice. Indeed,
in most districts no stenographic record is required
of grand jury proceedings except when the prosecutor desires a particular witness' testimony under
oath preserved for his own use. At its best, the
grand jury today operates as a sounding board
for the predetermined conclusions of the prosecuting official.
If the independence of the grand jury constitutes
the rationale for the grand jury clause of the fifth
amendment to the Constitution, as the Supreme
Court has itself suggested,36 then I respectfully
submit that, as we did with our unfortunate
"noble experiment" with prohibition, we should
eliminate by constitutional amendment the requirement of grand jury indictment. In response
to the exigencies of modern society, the grand jury
has ceased to function as an agency independent
from prosecutorial influence. It is today but an
4 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Williams, 438 F.2d
522 (9th Cir. 1971).
u See, e.g., United States v. United States District
Court, 238 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub
nora. Valley Bell Dairy Co. v. United States, 352 U.S.
981 (1956).
' See, e.g., Note, Grand Jury Proceedings: The
Prosecutor, The Trial Judge, and Undue Influence, 39
U. 35Cns. L. REv. 761, n.8 (1972).
See, e.g., FED. R. CmM. P. 6 (d).
36Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960).
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alter ego of the prosecutor. It has outlived its
reputation as the bulwark of democracy. Indeed,
it is that very pretention that has led some to
suggest that the grand jury has become instead
the bulwark of prosecutorial immunity, encouraging abuses by permitting the prosecutor to carry
on his work with complete anonymity.37
In the face of the demonstrated inability of the
grand jury to function as an independent investigative agency, and the obvious reasons therefore, it
is surprising to me that opposition to its abolition
continues in some circles s Those who favor its
continuation point to the famous grand jury investigations of the 1920's and 1930's most notably
New York's "racket busting" grand juries directed
by Special Prosecutor (later Governor) Thomas
E. Dewey. Through these examples, it is contended
that absent an independently functioning body
such as a grand jury, society may not protect itself
against the recalcitrant, corrupt or politicallymotivated prosecutor. At the outset it should be
observed that these exceptional investigations
were prompted not by any forceful initiative of any
grand jury but solely as a result of newspaper
exposures. The investigations were organized,
controlled and directed by Special Prosecutor
Dewey with his talented special assistants. The
role of the grand jury was, as usual, passive, only
placing its official stamp upon the labors of these
special prosecuting authorities. Could not Mr.
Dewey have achieved the same praiseworthy result
in a probable cause hearing before a competent
legal officer?
It has also been suggested that the mere existence of the grand jury acts as a deterrent to the
presentation of unfounded accusations by overzealous and malicious prosecutors."9 Of course, no
empirical data is available to support this theory.
Although difficult to refute for the same reason, in
my judgment both logic and my experience mitigate its persuasiveness. In the first place, the
theory, like all others in support of the grand jury,
37 See, e.g., Antell, supranote 8 at 156; Note, Grand
Jury: Bulwark of ProsecutorialImmunify?, 3 LOYOLA
(CHICAGo) L.J. 305 (1972); Note, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, The Trial Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. CHr. L. Rxv. 761 (1972).
38See, e.g., R. YouNGER, Tan PEoPsns' PANEL: THE

GRAND

JuRY n

=

UNITED STATEs,

1634-1941 (1963);

Wickersham,
supra note 8.
39
The Grand Jury serves two great functions. One
is to bring to trial persons accused of crime upon
just grounds. The other is to protect persons
against unfounded or malicious prosecutions...
Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 394
(1958).

presumes the existence of a strong independent
body intelligently and carefully analyzing the
evidence presented to it. As we have seen, such
independence has long since vanished under the
strain of outside forces. Moreover, this myth of
grand jury independence affords the prosecutor
anonymity in the exercise of his discretion. I
suggest that the consequence of such misplaced
responsibility for the initiation of a prosecution
encourages, rather than stifles, mal-intended
prosecution and character assassination.
In a recent national telecast of the brilliant and
popular series entitled "America-A Personal
History of the United States," that infamous part
of our colonial history known as the Salem trials
was realistically re-enacted before millions of
Americans. In one of the moving scenes of this
portrayal its outstanding author and commentator,
Alistair Cooke, is seen sitting at the fireside of
historic Rebecca Nurse House and heard speaking
about the self protective community reflexes
which inspired the Salem witch hunts. His beautifully delivered analysis of that horrible tragedy
brought him logically and dramatically to the
following startling conclusion:
I am thinking about the Grand Jury system which
was invented in England centuries ago. The idea
being that before a man was brought to trial a company of his neighbours who knew him would have a
pretty good idea whether there was a plausible
case. Well, it was abolished in England on the
grounds that in a city of several millions it was
very unlikely that a Grand Jury would know him.
But its been retained here, and when the Grand
Jury meets and says there is a case it brings in a
bill of indictment. And I often wonder how many
Americans see headlines, "so and so indicted," how
many people confuse indictment with conviction,
how many tend to think with the good neighbours
of Salem, that a man accused is a man guilty.
After a lifetime of personal observation, I concur
completely in the curt observations of a recent
commentary:
The grand jury has thus become in effect an administrative agency, executing in secrecy and with
unlimited discretionary power, the policies, also determined in secret, of law enforcement officers who
continue to maintain the fiction that the grand
jury is a free and autonomous body impartially
ferreting out objective truth. This proposition is
simply no longer believable.0
40Shannon, supra note 8, at 167.
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It is sadly ironic that the secrecy of the grand
jury, the original source of its independence in the
Earl of Shaftesbury's case, has through the passage
of time been transformed into a shield of the
prosecutor, immunizing him from public scrutiny
and responsibility for his conduct."
I am convinced that the myth of the grand jury,
with its price in terms of time," money, and energy
to the system of criminal justice in this country,
must be abandoned. If we are to continue to meet
the challenges and demands placed upon our
system of justice, then we must devise and implement a meaningful alternative to this archaic and
inefficient institution.
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As I stated at the outset, I favor a system which
would bring theory into line with reality by placing
the responsibility for initiating criminal prosecutions where it in fact already exists--with the
prosecuting attorney. Prosecutions should be
commenced upon the filing of an information
signed by the prosecutor, and be followed by a
probable cause hearing before a judicial officer
who would determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to allow the prosecution to continue to
trial. A most salutary result of such a process
would be the removal of the anonymity which
presently enshrouds the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion through the vehicle of the grand jury.
My suggestion would encompass the transfer to
the prosecutor all powers which currently belong
to the grand jury. Thus, for example, the subpoena
power would be lodged with the prosecuting
41Professor Kenneth Culp Davis strongly remonstrates the present state of affairs:
In our entire system of law and government, the
greatest concentrations of unnecessary discretionary power over individual parties are not in the
regulatory agencies but are in the police and prosecutors. Unfortunately, our traditional legal classifications-"Administrative Law," the "Administrative Process" and "Administrative Agencies"have customarily excluded police and prosecutors.
... [T]here has been a failure to transfer know-how
from advanced agencies, such as the federal regulatory agencies, to such backward agencies as the
police departments of our cities. I think that both
police and prosecutors, federal as well as state and
local, should be governed by many principles that
have been created by and for our best administrative agencies. The police are among the most important policy-makers of our entire society. And
- they make far more discretionary determinations
in individual cases than any other class of administrators; I know of no close second.
K. DAvis, DISCRETiONARY JusTicE 222 (1969).
See Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D.

229, 253 (1972).
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officer. This concept insofar as it relates to nontestimonial identification or evidence, has already
been suggested to the Judicial Conference by its
Advisory Committee." It might also be noted
that most federal regulatory agencies already
possess subpoena power." Witnesses could be
examined under oath as well as in secret, their
testimony being recorded by an official court
reporter. Testimony would thus be preserved for
use at trial, if necessary. Authority to extend
immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony would also be given the prosecuting attorney.
Indeed, federal prosecutors already enjoy such
authority under the new Omnibus Crime Act. 8
Upon reaching a determination that a prosecution should be initiated, the prosecutor would then
file a criminal information with the court in much
the same fashion as indictments are now presented.
A hearing to determine whether there is probable
cause to proceed with the prosecution would then
be scheduled. The hearing would be conducted
before a judicial officer such as a magistrate. I
suggest that the hearing be adversary in nature,
with the accused given the right to appear with
counsel, cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses
and present evidence in his own behalf.Y
The benefits which would accrue from the system which I have described seem to me to be
unlimited. The determination of whether a citizen
would be required to answer criminal charges
brought against him would be made by a member
of the judiciary. The sham of the "autonomous"
grand jury would be discarded in favor of a judgment made by one trained and skilled in the law,
and more importantly not subject to the direction
and control of the prosecuting agency. True independence would be restored, thereby revitalizing
the concept that a citizen should be protected
against unfounded accusation of crime, whatever
its source.
43 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Proposed Amendments to Criminal Rules, rule 41.1,
reported in 52 F.R.D. 409, 462-67 (1971).
"See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 409 (e) (1970); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 49 (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78 (u) (1970).
* See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966),
wherein the Court held that the petitioners would be
allowed to examine the grand jury minutes relating to
trial testimony of four government witnesses, despite
the fact that these witnesses were available for crossexamination.
41 Omnibus Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970).
47 This procedure is now successfully used in our
military justice system. Military Justice Act of 1969,
10 U.S.C. § 832 (1970).
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Investigative powers so necessary to the orderly
maintenance of a peaceful society would not be
curtailed. They would simply be lodged with the
prosecuting authority, where their de facto exercise
has already come to reside. Constitutional guarantees would not be diluted in the slightest. Judges
would remain available to entertain motions
seeking to prevent any over-reaching by prosecutors. The civil analogue to such a procedure
would be the protective order issued in the context
of discovery disputes.'1 Also, a transcript of the
prosecutor's investigative proceedings would
always be available for review by the judge.
The advantages which some contend flow from
the secret nature of grand jury proceedings would
also be preserved under the system I propose.
Although this secrecy has been the subject of wellintended criticism in recent years,'4 no one can
question that in some cases it has its benefits,
during the investigatory phase of a prosecution.
It is said to encourage disclosure by witnesses who
have information concerning the commission of a
crime, to prevent outside influences from contaminating the investigation, to prevent the
accused from fleeing prior to being charged, to
limit subornation of perjury, and to protect the
innocent from the harm that might be visited upon
them by disclosure of an investigation not leading
to a formal charge.
Perhaps the most significant by-product of my
suggestion will be the focusing of responsibility
and concomitant accountability for the initiation
of a criminal prosecution with the prosecuting
authority. No longer will the prosecutor be able to
hide anonymously behind the shield of the grand
jury. His decision to prosecute will be reviewable
by a trained and independent legal officer. As
with the conduct of our other institutions of
government, public scrutiny will follow his actions.
In my considered judgment, such a scheme cannot
help but have a sobering impact upon the so-called
"overzealous" prosecutor. Furthermore, our courts
would be relieved of many cases now returned by
grand juries at the urging of such prosecutors
despite woefully insufficient evidence to convict.
Another important contribution which would
result from the system I advocate would be a
cubstantial increase in the efficiency and economy
of our system of criminal justice. It cannot be
doubted that the daily operation of grand juries
in the communities across this land constitutes a
4"See FED. RMCiv. P. 26 (c).
9See, e.g., AnteU, supranote 8; Foster, supranote 8.

very expensive project. Nor can we underestimate
the unnecessary waste in the energies of our law
enforcement and prosecuting personnel generated
by the totally repetitious task of making presentations before the grand jury. The elimination of this
needless squandering of resources would be a great
boon to the administration of justice.
The defenders of the grand jury system, I suspect, will greet my proposals with the customary
loud cry that the problem of the recalcitrant or
politically-motivated prosecutor remains unresolved. They will no doubt urge that the concentration of so much power in the hands of the
prosecutor permits him to protect his political
friends from criminal investigations. Thus, political
fraud and corruption will stand as the unwitting,
but nonetheless, grateful beneficiaries of my suggestions.
In response, I would submit that a prosecutor
so inclined under our present system would simply
fail to present such investigations to a sitting
grand jury. Referring again to the famed racket
busting grand juries in New York during the
1930's, I note that it was the extrinsic pressure
of the news media which brought about the appointment of Special Prosecutor Dewey. And it
was the resourcefulness of Dewey and his staff
which ultimately produced evidence sufficient for
indictments. I would suggest that the problem
could be solved similarly under my proposal. The
court, either on its own motion or upon application
of an interested citizen, would retain the power to
appoint a special prosecutor. It would then conduct
an investigation in the same manner that I have
prescribed for its duly constituted counterpart.
In regard to what we know as the grand jury
presentment or report, I feel that characterizing
such reports as the product of the grand jury is
again a misnomer. Their preparation, from the
initial fact investigation to the final drafting,
represents the exclusive effort of the prosecutor
and his staff. The grand jury merely affixes its
imprimatur prior to the filing of the report with
the court. Under my suggestion, the prosecutor
would retain the authority to file such reports and
the court would retain its present power to accept
or reject them. I think it worthy of mention that
this almost disused function of the grand jury
has now been generally supplanted by legislative
investigating commissions and regulatory agencies
with elaborate staffs and highly skilled experts at
their disposal.

WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL
CONCLUSION

In light of the Supreme Court's recent observations concerning the grand jury, I feel that the
time is now at hand to eliminate that ancient
institution's place in our system of law. I have
long contended that it has outlived its usefulness
and has degenerated into nothing but a convenient
shield for the prosecutor. Today, it represents a
misallocation of the responsibility for the decision
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to initiate a criminal prosecution by perpetuating
the myth that it stands as a bulwark between the
prosecutor and the accused. Before the evergrowing demands placed upon our system of
justice completely overwhelm us, it is time to face
reality. A constitutional amendment is necessary
to effect such a change on the federal level. The
enormity of that task must not deter us. Let us
begin-now!

